








LONDON: HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 
1950 
TWO SHILLINGS NBT 
GENERAL PREFACE 
The series of Civil Defence handbooks and pamphlets is produced 
under the authority of the Home Secretary by the Civil Defence 
Depanment of the Home Office with the assiSlance of and in 
co-operation with the Secretary of State for Scotland and other 
Ministers concerned. 
Measures ('OT safeguarding the civil population against the effects of 
war which these publications describe, have become an essential part 
of the defenSive organisation of tbis country. The need for them is 
nol related to any belief tbat war is imminent. It is JUSt as necessary 
that preparations for Civjl Defence should be made in time of peace 
as it is tbat prcpar�tions should be made for tbe Armed Forces. 
The publications cover. as far as is possible. measures \\bicb can be 
taken to mitigate the effects of all modern forms of 3Hack. Any 
scheme of Civil Defence, if it is to be efficient, must be up·to-date and 
must take account of all the various weapons which might become 
available. The scale of bombing experienced in Great Britain during 
the 1939·45 war might be considerably exceeded in any future war. 
and types of weapons and lactics which were not experienced in tbi'i 
country migbt conceivably be used against it in the future. It does 
not follow tbat any one of the weapons. e.g., the atomic bomb. will 
necessarily be used, and it is most important that a proper balance IS 
held between what is likely and what is possible. 
The usc of poison gas in war was forbidden by tbe Geneva Gas 
Protocol of 1925, to which this country and aU the other countries of 
the Western Union were parties. At the outbreak of a war. His 
Majesty's Government would try to secure an undertaking from the 
enemy not to use poison gas. Nevertheless the risk of poison gas 
being used remains a possibility and cannot be disregarded any more 
tban can certain further developments in other scientific fields. 
The publications are designed to describe not only precautionary 
schemes which experience in the last war proved to be extremely 
effective in preventing avoidable injury and loss of Hfe. or widespread 
dislocation or national industries. but also the training, both technical 
and tactical, which will be required of the personnel of the Civil 
Defence Corps if they are to be ready effectively to play their part 
if war should ever break out. The publications aim at giving the 
best available information on methods of defence against all the 
various weapons. Information is not complete in respect of some of 
these weapons and the best methods of countering them. but as results 
o( experimental work and other investigations mature. they will 
be revised and added to from time to time so that the Civil Defence 
Corps may be kept up-to-date and training may be on the most 
modern and experienced lines. 
Binders (or Manual of Ba.�ic Traioiol are available (rom H.M. Slatioaery m", 
price I.r. Od. net 
697J2 
This picture shows the mushrooming of the column of smoke which rose 
60,000 fcct into the air over the Japanese port and industrial centre of Nagasaki. 
1 h.s rm;t ure sho"s the u!"per portIon of the .;Iuud fro.lm lhe burst or the atom;c 
bomb ovcr thc warships as:!ocmbled In the I.lgoon at BikinI hland, 
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FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER 
Tbe object of tbjs pamphlet is to provide all members of tbe Civil 
Defence Corps and other Services associated with Civil Defence 
with a short manual of practical information about the atomic bomb 
and its effects. It is. of course, OUf earnest hope that we shall 
never have to experience the horrors of an atomic attack. The 
tremendous [orce of atomic power should be used for industrial and 
humanitarian purposes and not for mass destruction. Ever since 
tbe Washington Declaration, which T signed with tbe President of 
the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada in November 
1945, tbe United Kingdom has pressed for international agreement 
to ensure that atomic energy should be used only for peaceful pur­
poses. But any such agreement would be illusory without the most 
rigorous system of international control. Although nearly two years 
ago nine out of the eleven members of the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission agreed on what they considered to be a really 
effective plan for the control of atomic energy and although this 
plan was subsequently approved by the overwhelming majority of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Soviet Union has 
so far refused to accept it, and has instead put forward counter­
proposals which were rejected in the Commission by a nine to two 
vote on the ground that they did not provide an adequate basis for 
effective international control. We shall not. however, abandon 
Qur hope tbat an effective system of international control may 
ultimately be adopted by tbe United Nations. and we for our part 
will certainly do aU in our power to make such an agreement possible. 
In tbe meantime we must proceed with our Civil Defence prepara­
tions on the basis that, in the event of war, we might be subjected 
to atomic attack and with the object of minimising the casualties 
which must inevitably accompany such an attack. 
Junc. 1950. 






This p�mphlcl is based on the known effects of tbe type of bombs 
used agalllsl the two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
Many people must have said to themselves. and. int1ced, must 
still be saying: "What is tbe good of doing anything against this 
weapon? There can be no defence against tbe atomic bomb." No 
complete defence can be provided against any weapon of war, but 
just as it proved possible to devise means of mitigating tbe conse· 
quences of other forms of auaek in the last war, so it is certain that 
means can be found of mitigating the consequences of atomic war­
farc. It is onc of the aims of this pamphlet to try and put tbe whole 
maller into proper perspective and to show. as IS indeed the truth, 
that tbere are to-day a great many practical steps tbat will greatly 
reduce the casualty producing power of tbis bomb. And it is 
confidently hoped, as time goes on and knowledge increases, tbat 
the defence can be steadily improved. The introduction of tbe 
atomic bomb into warfare represented a great and unparalleled 
jump in the power of a single offensive weapon. It is the business 
of defence to catch up, as it has always caught up: and great 
efforts have been and are being directed to this end. Of tbe three 
major effects produced when an atomic bomb explodes. two-blast 
and flash·burn-are not new although they have their own special 
characteristics. The third-radiological effect-is novel in character 
and in its results. and there will. tberefore. be a natural tendency 
to give it special prominence. But it is most important that a 
correct balance should be maintained. a point which instructors 
should specially note. Some of the radiological effects, although 
Ihey must be taken into account, will not normaUy be ex-pcrienced ; 
nor should they necessarily prove a serious hazard to operations 
if tbey were encountered. 
There are many problems to which, at present, only imper(ect 
or partial solutions can be given. As knowledge increases, so will 
these gaps gradually be filled. And while the situation that might 
be created by the use of atomic bombs would be of the utmost 
severity, involving many casualties and beavy destruction to pro­
perty, it can be said with confidence tbat the defensive measures 
which are being and wiH continue to be gradually developed. backed 
up by sound teaching and good trainjog will enable th¢ effects to 
be greatly reduced. 
[t would be outside the scope of this pamphlet to deal witb tbe 
general Civil Defence measures which might provide protection 
against or mitigation of the consequences of an atomic bomb. The 
measures which proved effective in the last war, such as the warning 
system, the provision of shelters, schemes of dispersal and measures 
[or preventing the spread of fire. would undoubtedly reduce casualties 
and damage under conditions of atomic warfare. 
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Appendix I deals brieRy witb tbe elements of nuclear pbySICS. and 
is mcluded in the hope that it will belp all concerned to a better 
understanding of the practical problems which this new weapon has 
produced. For those who may wish to study further the science 
of nuclear physics many publications already exist. But such studies 
3rc not cso;"ential for ordinary Civil Defence purposes, and the aim 
bas been to describe. in this pamphlet. only the major results 
experIenced when an atomic bomb is burst. and the counter-measures 






FEATURES OF ATOMIC EXPLOSION 
I. Methods of Attack 
Atomic bombs might be exploded on the ground. under water, 
low in the air. or higb in the air. 
With the high air burst bomb, the material damage on the target 
area is the most widespread. With tbe low air burst bomb the area 
affected would be srnalJer but the material damage more intense. 
With 3n under water burst, the maximum area of contamination 
would be experienced. 
There is little doubt that tbe high air burst bomb is the most 
effective against a Donna! target, i.c. a well built up area. since 
the maximum blast effect will be experienced. There may be 
special circumstances. connected with a particular target, whicb 
would merit a variation of these tactics. but tbey would be the 
exception rather than the rule. 
2. General Description of Explosion 
When an atomic bomb explodes in the air. a ball of fire several 
hundred feel in diameter results. From this a dazzling Hash of 
Jight. intense heat. anct various forms of radioactivity shoot out in 
all directions, followed by blast and sound waves. The ligbt. heat 
and radioactive effects begin to arrive at the target area on tbe 
ground some seconds before the slower moving blast and sound .. 
waves, while the radioactive .. fission" products, into which the 
material of the bomb breaks up on explosion. arrive suH later. if 
at all. 
The ball of fire, quickly losing brilliance. rises up in the air, with 
tbe ascending hot gases produced by the explosion. in a column, 
first multicoloured and tben white, of swirling gas and particles. 
Tbis column rises to a height of many thousands of feet and billows 
out giving the appearance of a huge mushroom on its stalk. On 
the ground below, where tbe blast has hit. the scene is obscured by 
a cloud of dust and smoke. 
3. Dangers Resulting (rom Explosion 
The enormous energy released from the explosion of an atomic 
bomb takes three main forms capable of causing damage to materials 
and danger to persons. These are Heat, Radioactivity and Blast. 
Heat Hash and blast. thougb much more intense and of much 
greater range in the case of the atomic bomb. are already known 
in warfare in connection with high explosive weapons; bUI radio· 
activity is a new effect peculiar to the atomic weapon and produces 
an immediate danger at the time of explosion. It might also, under 
suitable circumstances, subsequently give rise to persisting danger 
from contamination or irradiation of ground or materials. 
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Taking these forms of effect in th order of their arrival on the 
target. B hnc! descrlpuon IS gl\<cn of each and IS (ollo\.l.cd in succeed­
ing chapter\ by a detailed com.ideration of the damage and danger 
they ma) cau� to property and persons. and some of the problems 
they will acatc fClr Civ il Dclence . 
(i) /lun flujl! , On the explo\ion of the bomb a wave of intense 
heat called " heal na,h .. radiates in all direction . The rays travel 
111 ",raight hncs at the "J'Ced of light (186.000 miles per second) 
and arc so inlco'c that the surface of object'S just underneath tbe 
ball of lire arc railicd 10 tcmperature by man} thousands of degrees. 
Lven al di!\tanccs of five miles. the n3.�h is suflicicnll) inten� to 
produce a feeling of bodily warmth. This heat na,h lasts only 
about a �ccond and has no greal penctrallng power. 
1 he heat na,h. ho""ever. is capable of dircctly igniting inflammable 
material <"u,h as dark cloth. paper. and dry rotted wood (as it did 
10 Japan), thereby starling immediately mally flrcs simultaneously 
ovcr a ""Ide area. holaled inst,lnccs of the !o.tamng of such primary 
IIres \\ ere reported at dl!o.tance� of nearly twO mil� from the centre 
of dJmag� (£round lero) and man) buildlllgs near 10 the centre, 
\\ hich !o.UT\ t\cd the blast efIect. \\erc gutted by fire� started by the 
heat 11<.1"h \\hich entered through \1.indows and l)pen d!lor!o. and 
ignited inflammable contents. The surra� l,r man} materials which 
do nOI normall) ... how vi ... ible �Igns ('of heat \\a ... affected, roof tiles 
\\erc bh ... tcn:d, r('Ii�hcd £ranlte rougheneJ, and concretc reddened 
at di!o.tanccs \ar}lng from half to one mile from ground zero. 
Thl.!�1.! detail... arlo! given to empha'ilzc the range and degree of 
heat 113,h. but it Will De appreciated that In a �ountry like ours. 
where the great l1l.ljonty of buildings are of brick, �tone or concrete. 
the risk of large numbers of firt:� being sl3Tl\!d b} heat nash is mu h 
less thiln il was in Japanese cllic:s. 
• When 10 the fire·r31�ing danger ... of Ihe heat t1a\h arc added tho .. e 
of secondary lires which normall} occur following the collapse of 
blllldlOgs nn dOIl1CSlll: fire ...  the breaking of gas mains. and the 
damage to clectncit) communication\ re .. ulting from blast, it will 
be \cen that the atomic bomb is a potent (lre.ral!o.ing weapon. And 
il \\ 111 bc nccc�sary to incrcase precautio n\ again ... t tire, panicularly 
a!o. n::ganh the JIlnammable '('Inter.t\ of c.llhcrn isc tire re�isting 
building�. 
(ii) RtU/iou("[illl), (/mmeJitm.' Dmu!cr)' \\ hen an atomic bomb 
cxph)de� radloJctl\it) is gi\cn off in all directions in the form of 
radl.Hion CJllcd ., �amma " ra�s anJ as pJnide'i called .. ncutrons ". 
1 he bomb matcrial It,elf al .. o 'pUb up into radlOat.:ti\"c du�t known 
as .• t:i\\Ion products ". 
(a) Gamma RCI.\.\ Thc�c ra)\ tra\cl al lhc 'i�cd of light and 
Me ..,callercu in the .lir and reflected from nearb) objecb in much 
the !'>al11l.! \\a) a, .In! Iignt )"J.}'. Thu,. althoup.h the mOst lOtense 
he,lIn ll[ ,':Imma rJ.) " the dIrect on!! from the hall of lire. there 
I ... nc\Crthdess some gamma radialion from c\'cr) other part of the 
,ky, jU\t a� In \lIon£. ,unlight a room which faces north 'itill receives 
lig.ht fmm the \ i,iblc !o.J...) and b) reHcction from other objects. 
�10\1 of the gamma rnys arc emitted in the fir�a few scconds. The 
1111cn.,ily dccre.n,c\ rapidly as time gl'C., 011 :Ind as the emitting 
llIalerial move, 3\\3) by T1sing in thc ball of fire. After onc minute 
thcre I� hulc danger [rom gamma ra)s. Judging from experience 
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of hIgh aIr burst bombs in Japan (i.e. those causing the most wide­
spread damage) tbe effective danger range from these bombs 
appeared to be about one and a quarter to one and a half miles 
from the cenlre of damage. 
Gamma rays have very great powers of penetration and will go 
through considerable thicknesses of building and other mataials. 
They will readily enter the human body and are very damaging 
to it. They do not. however, render radioactive tbe materials whkh 
they penetrate, and their intensity is reduced in the process. So 
far as is known at present, no form of clothing will give protection 
against gamma rays. but a large measure of immunity can be 
obtained by structural precautions of a conventional character. This 
is LUore fully discussed in Chapter I I I. 
Unprotected persons within half a mile of ground zero would • 
receive a fatal dose of radiation and. at about tbree quarters of a 
mile. half might die. Beyond this range the intensity of the rays 
falls off and there should be relatively few deaths; but les�er elfects 
of radiation, such as loss of bair, might be expected up to one and a 
half miles. In Japan 15-20 per cent. of fatal casualties were attri-
buted to gamma rays. but the percentage might have been higher 
had the casualties survived other injuries. (See Fig. I.) 
The figures set out in tbe preceding paragraph are those given as 
an estimate by the British Mission from the experience of the hIgh 
air burst bombs used in Japan and under similar conditions would 
apply to persons in a British city. If must be stressed houoel'er 
that they apply 10 persons caught in the open with 110 warning or 
suitable she/rer, and that even ordinary houses will give some degree 
of protection by lessening the intensity of the rays that penetrate 
them. 




(b) !\tutrOtH The .. e arc the other form of penetrating radiation 
producing immediate danger at tbe time of explosion. They are 
01 III ute paniclc� emined (rom the split nuclei of tbe atoms at tbe 
lime of explosion. and they travel at great speed in all directions 
rcaching the ground. if near enough to it, almost at once. The 
durallon of tbeir cmic;�ion is c;hort. probably not more than a few 
second!;. Their lethal range too is much c;horter tbao that of gamma 
fa),!), and it i!:i probable tbat the dangers associated with them will 
come only with the other roons of atomic attack, rather than from 
high air burst bombs. 
cutrons have great powers of pcnetrauon both of materials and 
of the human bod} to '" bieb they are injurious. but at the time 
tbey arc nOl felL Tbey differ from gamma rays in tbat tbey reDder 
radIOactive many matenals which they penetrate. This (orm o( 
radioactivity is called" induced" and can persist (or considerable 
periods dcpcndinl; on tbe matenal Irradiated. 
Tbe l3�ualues hkely to occur from neUlrans alODe arc difficult 
to estimate but CXlCpt c1o� underneath an air burst bomb the thick­
ness of concretc wHicient to gl\C prote:cuoD against gamma rays 
would abo £i\c protc'llon against neutrons. It must be remembered 
that probably thc mOst Important factors 10 cilusing fatal casualties 
\l.lthln the ncutron range arc from the effects of blast. i.e. coUapse 
of bUildings. heat nash and gamma ray flash. It is possible. 
however. that there might be dangcr from some induced aDd persist­
ing radloacti\ ity which neutrons produce in other materials. 
(iii) Radioacli�·tty (Delayed Dallger).' In the preceding para­
graphs some mention has been made of .. fission products" and of 
neutrons causing" induced" radioacti\O'lty in materials which they 
renetrate. These two forms o[ radioactivIty produce .. delayed .. 
danger from the penetraung gJmma rays they give off and [rom 
actual radioactive pal tides gelling on lhe body or being breathed 
or swallowed. 
(a) Fi.uivfI Producl.\' fhclIe 3rc the lDtensely radjoacl1ve particles 
resultmg from atomic Ihsioo The likelihood of tbese products being 
deposited io dao�crous amOll.ts 00 tbe target area from high air 
burst bombs is small. They are carried up m the column of smoke 
and asc..:nding hot gJ�es to :1 \o'cry conSiderable height and are thele 
dispersed by the wmds and e\cntuJlly become harmless. 11 might be 
pollsible. while the)' arc still fairly concentrated. [or a dangerous 
deposit to be brought to earth down wind of the target by a rain­
storm, If tillS did happen, the area contaminated would not normally 
be very great and il might easily occur 111 open country where very 
lillie harm might result. The probability of thIS happening is not 
very great. though it cannot be ignored. and IS something [or which 
a watch should be kepI. 
With low air bursts or ground bursts these products will create B 
danger from radioactivity as the) will be deposited on the ground 
and in the crater and rna)' drift along with the wind, falh.ng out as 
they go and creatlOt: a fan shaped area of cvlllJmination of sufficient 
intensity to cause danger for a number of miles down wmd. 
in underwater cxplmions the fhsion products will be present in 
tbe watcr and mi�t throwD up and can contamlDale persons and 
objects over several square wiles, 
10 
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Areas c�mta�a� by fission products or induced radioactivity will remam radioactive after the explosion. emitting penetrating 
g
.
amma r�ys and giving rise to danger from actual radioactive par· 
tlcles geulDg on to the body or being breathed or swallowed. Ex­
posure to atmospheric condilions, heat. chemical treatment. etc .• will 
have no eUect in destroying them. If an element is radioactive it 
will decay normally according to its specific " half life" which may 
be a few seconds or many years. "Half life" is the term used to 
indicate the length of time it takes for a radioactive element to 
lose half its radioactivity by natural decay. 
As many different elements with different half lives may be in­
volved in causing radioactive contamination, and as the intensity of 
the danger will also vary with many factors such as height of 
explosion. climatic and meteorological conditions, the nature and 
composition of the ground, etc .. it is not possible to say in advance 
how long a contarn.inated area will remain dangerous; but in excep· 
tional circumstances it may be some time before it could be safely 
re-occupied. 
The higb initial intensity, however, W11.l fall very quickly and allow 
rescue parties, fire fighters and other Civil Defence workers to enter 
contaminated areas and carry out essential work normally without 
any special protective clothing though the time they stay there may 
have to be limited in accordance with a certain maximum permissible 
radiation dose, which is now being investigated and will be announced 
in due course. 
Though radioactivity is unseen and unfelt, its presence can be 
detected and its intensity measured by instruments which are 
described in a later chapter; as is also the outfit which would be 
worn to prevent fission products getting on the body. 
(b) Induced Radioactivity: This is caused by the neutrons given 
off from the nuclei of the split atoms penetrating materials and 
rendering certain of them radioactive and dangerous. As with fission 
products the danger only occurs with low air or ground bursts, and 
will. in effect, increase by a small proportion the radioactive danger 
caused by the fission products. This induced radioactivity is also 
found in undenvater bursts; but the induced radioactivity is usually 
masked by the enormous radioactivity of the fission products. 
(iv) Blast: The difference between the blast from an atomic bomb 
and that from a high explosive bomb is that. at a distance from each 
at which the pressures are equal, the duration of the blast from the 
atomic bomb is a hundred or more times longer than that from the 
high explosive bomb. Tills results in the mechanism of damage from 
the atomic bomb being quite different from that from the high 
explosive bomb. 
Figure 2 shows a typical pressure-time curve from a medium 
sized high explosive bomb at a distance at which fairly severe 
structural damage would be caused. It will be seen that the pressure 
rises to a value of 15 Ib./sq. in. (over 2.000 Ib./sq. ft.) which is much 
more than the sUltic load which any normal structure could with· 
stand. However, this pressure only lasts for a very short time 
(I /10 sec.) and it is therefore much more in the nature of a blow 
suddenly delivered to the structure tban a static load. The ability 
of a suddenly applied blow to cause damage is determined both 
I 1 
by tbe pressure and by tbe time for wbicb it acts. In fact it LS 
the product of these two (known as the <C impulse ,.) which measures 
the damaging ability of the blast from a normal high explosive 
bomb. This point cao easily be demonstrated on an ordinary door. 
U tbe door is unlatched it can be pushed open by a force of a few 
ounces applied somewhat slowly by the little finger. However, if the 
door is SLruck qUite a hard sharp blow with tbe fist it will not move 
very far. even though Lhe instantaneous Corce between the fist and 
the door (corresponding to the blast pressure) may bave beeD maDY 
pounds. In fact if the door is hit hard enougb i t  is quite likely 
to be torD oIT its binges, and tbis, of course, is JUSt what bigb 
explosive blast does. It gives things a hard sharp blow rather wan 
a gentle push, and many of the so-called freaks of blast can quite 
easily be explained ODce tbis point is fuIJy appreciated. 
Again it will be seen [rom Figure 2 that we pressure. or positive, 
phase of the blast is foUowed by a negative or suction phase, Allhougb 
tbe suction in this negative phase is only about t of tbe pressure 
in lbe positive phase. the duration is about 3 times as long, and 
therefore tbe illlpulJes in the two phases are approximately equal 
Hence tbeir potential abilities to cause damage are also approxi­
mately equal. However, since the suction phase occurs last, there 
is a tendency for its e[fccts to be the more noticeable. For example. 
the wall of a building may be badly cracked in the pressure pbase and 
may then collapse outwards in the sucllon phase. 
If tbe impulse crit.erion were applied to the atomic bomb it  would 
be c)..pccled to demolish 9-inch brick walJs to a distance of over 
10 miles. HO\\-'cver, at this distance from the atomic bomb the peak 
pressure is only about 0.1 lb./sq. in.  whIch is very much less than 
the Slatic strength of tbe wall, and consequently, however long tbis 
pressure is applied, it cannot hurt tbe wall. It will thus be seen 
that the impulse criterion breaks down (or the atomic bomb. 
The position js tbat tbe blast impulse is only Lhe criterion of damage 
so long as lhe maximum blast pressure is substantially greater than 
the static strength of the target, and this is nOl the case at the 
limits of damage to normal structures with an atomic bomb. With 
the atomic bomb, therefore, blast pressure rather lhan impulse 
tends to be the criterion of damage. If the effective blast pressure 
exceeds the static strength of the structure failure must be e.'(pected, 
wl1ereas if it is less no failure can occur however long the duration 
of the blast. rn fact, atomic bomb blast is more like strong wind 
than the sudden blow which represents the effeclS of higb explosive 
blast, and many of the failures observed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
resembled closely the kind of damage that might be done to buildings 
by a very strong wind. 
The reason for the absence of suction damage at Hiroshima and 
Naga ... aki should now be clear. As stated earlier the impulses in 
tbe positive and negative phases are about equal. so that if blast 
impulse is the criterion of damage LUnny cases of suction faiJure 
must be expected. Howe\"cr. the pressure in the positive phase 
is 3 or 4 timt!s as great as in the negative. so that when pressure is 
the criterion of failure, few, if aoy. suction failures are to be 
expected. rr a building does not fail under the pressure pbase it is 
rather unlikely to fail under the much lower prelisures in the suction 
phase. 
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The blast damage from an atomic bomb (and also from a large 
high explosive bomb) can be increased by bursting the bomb above 
ground level. The pressure wave from the bomb is then reflected 
by the ground and, since the reflected wave is travelling through air 
tbat has been compressed and heated by the direct wave, it tends 
to travel faster than. and to catcb up with. the direct wave. Where 
the reflected wave catches up with the direct wave the two coalesce 
to form what is called a Mach wave and it  is tbe formation of this 
wave which accounts for the increase in damage due to the air burst. 
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4. Casualty Considerations 
40 
The causes of casualties from the atomic explosion would be Hash 
bums, radioactivity, ordinary fire burns and mechanical injuries from 
falling masonry and Hying debris. Estimates of the percentage 
causes of death as assessed on experience in Japan is: -Heat Flash 
20·30 per cent., Gamma Rays 15·20 per cent., and Mechanical 
Injuries and Bums 50-60 per cent. 
5. Estimates of Casualties in a British City 
1f the people in our cities were caught, as were the Japanese, 
without warning, before any evacuation had taken place, and with 
no suitable shelters. the casualties caused by a high air burst bomb 
would be formidable. The British Mission to Japan estimated that 
under these circumstances as many as 50,000 people might lose 
their lives in a typical British city with a population density of 45 persons to the acre. Much can be done. however, to mitigate 
the effects of the bomb and to save life. and it is certain that with 
adequate advance preparations. including the provision of suitable 
shelters and with good Civil Defence services, the lives lost could 








10. Effects OD Persons 
CHAPTER II 
HEAT FLASH 
The effects of heat flash on unprotected people will be severe. 
The nearer to ground zero tbe greater the danger; those at ground 
zero would be killed. Severe third degree burns would result up 
to about 1 mile and burns of lesser intensity up to 21 miles. In 
Japan 20·30 per cent. of fatal casualties were attributed to flash 
burn. A simiJar proportion is to be expected in Britain if there 
is no warning and people are caught in the streets. (See Fig. 3.) 
If, however, tbere is enough warning for the population to take cover 
and they do so, tbe number of fatal casualties from flash burn 
should he relatively small. 
The duration of tbe heat Hash is very short. probably Dot more 
tban about a second or two. Moreover the rays travel in straight 
lines. Protection is therefore relatively easy and will be given 
by any form of building; while even clothing. though it may itself 
become ignited. affords some degree of protection for the skin 
underneath, particularly if not in close contact with the body. and 
especially if of a light rather than a dark colour. This colour 
differentiation onJy applies. however, at distances where the beat 
intensity has fallen below that which would fire the fabric as a 
whole. Fog and mist reduce the distances to which flashburn is 
experienced. 
1500 yds St.t,t burnl on t"poltd Ik,n 
/ "'�- lj m,lu 
"'�-1 m'ltl"'-� 
'''----21 mlltl Mild burn. On upo.td sk, ... 
FlO. 3. Radii of Heat Flash. 
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II. Effecls on Material 
It is diUicult to estimate from experieoce in Japan the fire danger 
which might result in Brhain. In lbjs country house construction 
and siting gives rise to a lesser fire risk. Moreover, our Fire 
Services and equipment are much better. To Hiroshima 4 square 
miles of the centre of the city were burnt out aod in Nagasaki 
about I! square miles. An American estimate for a possible 
burnout area of one of tbeir cities is about 2 square miles from a 
considerably more powerful and improved bomb, jf such can be 
produced. 
With '3 low air burst explosion the beat effects would be more 
intense but concentrated over a much smaller area; with a ground 
burst they would be mostly dissipated in Lbe crater area; and 
with an underwater bUTst the heat would be largely absorbed in 
convertlDg water into steam. 
12, Problems of a Fire Storm 
In the Hiroshima attack a lire storm was reported though this 
phenomenon was not experienced in Nagasaki. The production of 
a fire storm, either by an atomic bomb or a heavy saturation anack 
by a combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs, is a 
problem which is being scientiftcaJly studied. Nothing was known 
of this effect of certain methods of bombing untiJ after the vrar, 
when it was found to have occurred in Hamburg. and possibly 
also in several other German cities. 
The risk of a fire storn] being caused by a high or low air burst 
atomic bomb must be taken into account, Lbougb there will clearly 
be certain areas which will be much more susceptible to the raising 
of a fire storm than others. The features of a fire storm are tbe 
intense heat caused, together with the high winds which make 
the task of fire fighting and rescue much more difficult. A fire 
storm does not, however, start at once, and there will certainly be 
a number of preventive or mitigating measures which can be 
instituted beforehand and which will be made known in due course. 
One of the most important problems to study in this connection will 
be the recognition of symptoms that a fire storm may be in process 
of developing and tbe necessity of taking the most urgent possible 
steps to evacuate any personnel in tbe area wherever they may be. 
The lime lag between the actual bombing and the development of the 
fire stoml may be long or short, but in either case will demand the 
most urgent and immediate action if people in the area are lO be 
saved. As Iurlher data become available training will be given not 
only in appreciating tbe situat.ion but, also, in any preventive steps 




The effects of radiation i n  man may be:-
(a) Immed iate: At the time of the explosion. through entry into 
the body of gamma rays and neutrons. 
(b) Delayed : Subsequent to the explosion. through exposure of 
the person to the radioactive products of atomic fission; 
or to materials on the target which may have been rendered 
radioactive by neutrons (induced radioactivity). 
Although the entry of tbe gamma nash into the body 
is immediate. it must be remembered tbat the physiological 
results are delayed. 
17. Immediate Effects 
The main radiation hazard arises from direct exposure of the 
person 10 gamma rays and neutrons at the moment of explosion. 
Because of their great powers of penetration. however. both these 
agents may affect, in varying degrees of intensity. people within their, 
range who are protected by buildings from other effects of atomio 
explosion. 
Gamma rays and neutrons do not produce any sensa tory reaction� 
and the victim may not realise at the time the danger that he ha� 
incurred. 
The onset of tbe resulting symptoms (" radiation sickness ") is 
early or late according 10 the dose of radiation received: this win 
vary with the distance from the explosion and the degree of protec­
tion. if any, at the time it ocourred. 
In high air bursts, however. possibly the whole of the injury can. 
be attributed tQ gamma rays. since the range of effectiveness of the 
neutrons is very much more limited. 
18. Protection against Immediate Effects 
Against attacks by cenain types of war gases various other protec­
tive devices are available. such as protective clothing and preventive 
or curative ointments. It is emphasised that measures of this kind 
have no value against these " immediate" effects. i.e .. gamma rays 
and neutrons, though the position is not quite tbe same as regards 
.. delayed effects" as is shown in paragraph 20. 
It is. however, satisfactory to know that in the design of shelters 
protection against the lethal results of radioactivity is a practical 
proposition. 
The principle is that of .. screening ". Although gamma rays are 
extremely penetrating there is a Limit to their powers in this direction. 
When passing through matter they expend a proportion of their 
energy which is directly rela-ted to the total density of the material 
penetrated. Even air reduces their intensity somewhat. The denser 
the screening material the greater its power of reducing the intensity 





materials sucb as brick and concrete have a greater slopping power 
Lilan has wood (or a given thickness. and lead greater than either 
on account of its greater density. 
The walls of ordinary dwelling houses and surfaee sbelters of last­
war type would afford a definite though limited degree of protection. 
dependIng upon the distance from the point of explosion. RealJy 
thick rTI3sonry could remove the danger (rom gamma rays altogether. 
even close to ground zero, whilst a moderate lhkkness of canh 
affords excelJent protection ; and only a few feet of earth overhead 
would afford complete immunity lrom tbe effects of gamma rays. 
The Lhickncss of all ordmary materials which will afford complete 
immunity from the effects of gamma rays will be notified in due 
cour&C. 
Shellers of the last-war type, such as the Anderson. the surface 
shelter, tunnels and caves, trench shelters and the like, would pro· 
vide a very substantial degree of protection. which could be made 
complete with extra thickening. 
19. Delayed Efleets 
Oelayed radiat-ion risks are not considered likely to be serious 
wilh air burst atomic bombs. .If experienced tbey wi.1l be mainly 
due to the .agency of fission products and. more rarely. of induced. 
radioactivity : a remote possibility may arise (rom the employmen1i 
by an enemy of certain r.adioactive by-products. 
Fission Products : As stated in Chapter I it is unlikely that fission 
products in high concentration will be round on a target area unless 
the explosion has occurred at a low height. undcrground. or uoder� 
waler in close proximity to the target. Under these conditions tho 
initial contamination may present such a serious hazard tbat the 
affected arca may have to be evacuated for some time. 00 we 
other band. any area experiencing heavy contamination from a low 
air burst bomb will aJmost cenainly be completely pulverised by blast 
and unless there were people trapped io shellers io this area there 
might be no immediate need for any Civil Defence or other personnel 
to enter it. 
Apart from their external radialioo effects. fission products aro 
dangerous if they gain entrance ioto the body by inhalation. by. 
contamination 0( broken skin, or through contaminated food or drinlo 
C' radioactive poisoning to). 
I"duced Radioactivity : I n  a low air burst. many clements and 
their compounds in materials i n  tbe central zone may be rendered 
artificialJy radioactive through bombardment by neutrons released 
by the explosion. 
Altbougb the intensity of induced radioactivity may rapidly wane, 
prolonged exposure of lhe body to tbe radiations evolved may con­
stitute a definite hazard to man. 
Radioactive by-products : In we manufacture of fissile elements and 
in lbe operation of atomic piles. certain highly radioactive materials 
of varying half·lives are produced which may, theoretically. be used 
i n  war in the form o( radioactive dusts or clouds. The quantities 
so produced. however, are nOI likely to be so great as to create a 
senous menace : moreover, their progressive decline in activity. 
coupled with diflicult.ies in storage. carriage. bandling and loading. 




20. Protection against Delayed Effects 
There are six principles of protection against the effects of delayed 
radioactivity. They are : -
(i) Detection (Radiation 
·
Metering). 
(ii) Suitable Clothing .nd Equipment. 
(iii) Avoidance of Heavily Contaminated Areas. 
(iv) Personal Cleansing. 
(v) Decontamination. 
(vi) Periodical Medical Examination and Rules Governing 
Exposure. 
(i) Deleeliofl (Radiation Metering) 
Means of immediate detection of the presence of radioactivity 
already exist in tbe shape of radiation meters. These are inslruments 
which record the total radiation dose received at the SpOl where the 
instrument is. or, in some cases, the rate at which that dose is being 
received. Since gamma rays travel quite long distances in alr, these 
instruments average up tbe effects of fission products from a con· 
siderable area. just as the body would do. Other instruments. in 
their turn. will indicate the sligbtest trace of radioactive contamina­
tion on clothing or skin. resulting from dust or water contaminated 
by fission products. These meters wiJl be more fully discussed later 
in trus chapter. In this connection. however. it is important to 
remember tbat gamma rays of themselves are incapable of contami­
nating anything. or of rendering any material radioactive.- Gamma 
rays depend, for their effects. entirely on causing casualties from 
radiation sickness. 
Although scientific knowledge is not needed in the use of meters. 
a certain amount of training is necessary and will be given to selected 
individuals. Ability to manipulate and read instruments is not to 
itself enough. Training is needed in the interpretation of the readings 
taken. 
Three types of meter have been recommended for use in tbe Civil 
Defence Corps and ancillary Services. They arc as follows :­
(a) Individual Dosimeter. 
(b) Pon.ble Dose-rate Meter. 
(c) Contamination Meter. 
Illdividual Dosimeter : This is a smaU instrument which can be 
easily carried on the person. The type at present recommended for 
Civil Defence is known as the Quartz-Fibre Electroscope. It is about 
the size of. and sim.ilar in appearance to. a fountain pen. and has a 
clip by which it  can be fastened in the breast pocket � other types are 
under development. 
The total dose is recorded and the wearer can from time to time 
take a reading. and thus keep a constant check upon his own safety. 
The reading is taken by applying one end of tbe instrument to the 
eye and reading the dose on the scale which will be visible against 
tbe light. (See Fig. 4.) 
Portable Dose-Rate Meter : There is an important difference 
between this type of instrument and 'that just described. in that in­
stead of reading the total dose which has accumulated up to tbe 
• Scientists can detect slight activity following bombardment by gamma rays, 
but it is of no significance for the present purpose. 
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Photos Nos. I and 2. H I R 0 S H I M  A .  General views looking across the 
centre of damage, the approximate position of which is marked with an arrow. 
It will be seen that some of the framed buildings quite near the centre remained 
standill8. The tall building in Photo No. I is the same as thai seen in Photo No. 7. 




Photo O. 3. N A G  A S A K I .  A g�ncral view of the area near the centre 01 
damage. which IS to the left In the PictUre:, only 300 yw. a .... '3.)' from the bndge. 
Note the lillie lhJt remains (m the foreground) of blasted and burnt Japanese 
dwellings. For a VICW of such houses, undamaged. see Photo No. 19. 
l'hol0 No.4. N A G  A S A K I .  A general view showing some orthe Industrial 
bUIldings. That In the foreground was a gU{loo woodworking plant, just over a 
mile from the centre of damage, which ,",,'as beyond the group of chimneys of the 
MILSUbishi Steel Works, secn in the middle distance. 
1 
• 
Photo No. 5. N A G  A S A K I .  Reinforced concrete school ..... lth a timber 
roof, 500 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right of the photograph. 
The upper part of the long wall further from tbe explOSIon has been bent over, 
partly by a thrust through the roof from the other long "'-'all and partly by wind 
suction. ThIs is a typical case of " mass distortion." 
P�.OIO No. 6. N A G  A S A K I .  Mass distortion of steel framed shed 
buildings about half a mile from the centre of damage, which was to the right of 
the buildings in the photograph. It will be seen that the entire main frame is 
seriously distorted away from the explosion. 
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Photo No. 7. H I R 0 S H I M  A .  Reinforced concrete building about 
300 yds. from the centre of damage, '" hieh is 1.0 the left of the photograph. There 
was no serious structural damage, although a roof panel was depressed and some 
uHeroal party walls were dcneucd. Dcslgned for earthquake resistance. this 
building has a compOSite reinforced concrete and steel frame. 
Photo No. 8. H I R 0 S H I M  A .  Reinforced concrete building 200 yds. 
from the cemre of damage, which is to the nghl. The blast from the bomb forced 
the roof slab down. Ihe slab shearing round Ihe column heads. leaving the internal 
columns projccltng through Ihe debris. Few concrete buildings fai led in Ihis way. 
• 
Photo No. 9, H I R 0 S H I M  A .  Reinforced concrete school SOO yds. from 
the centre of damage. which IS to the right. The frame of this budding W".u of 
special desijn (portal) aod resisted the lateral for(cs. The outside walls were of 




PhotQ No. 10. N A G  A S A K I .  Reinforced concrete single storey factory 
rather less than a mde from Ihe centre of damage, which is to the right. The 
arched reinforced concrete roof failed, the side nearer the explosion being forced 
inwards and the far side forced upwards. 
Photo No. I I .  I I  I R 0 S H I M  A .  Small Sloel fra.med shed '* mIle from the 
cclUre of damage, showing the distortIon of the cntlN: fl1lnle"ork, "Ith the 
bUlldln� luning away from the e"ploslon, 
I)hoto No. 12. N A G  A S A K I .  Large steel framed shed In the Mltsubishi 
Steel Works. I nlile from the centre of damage. The 51«1 stanchions ha\(� b«n 
bent la",,,y from the e"plosion) and the roof trusses on both sides of these 
stanchIons have collapsed. 
�-- . 
Photo No. 13. N A G  A S A K I .  i mile from centre of damag�. Typical 
damaged machines in one of the many timber workshops dcstroyed by blast and 
fire. Some machines were overturned by movement of the bUildings. some 
destroyed by fire alone; others damaged by exposure to the weather. 
Photo No. 14. N A G  A S A K I .  Blast effect on a gasholder .; mile from 
ocone of damage. Note the way in which the whole framework has been bent 
away from the explosion. 
• 
• 
Photo No. IS. I I I R O S  I I I \1 A Thrcc siorey banL bUilding "Ilh load 
beanng bnck "ails of strong t:onstrU(;IIOn .1nd comparable: \\ Ith Brilish standards. 
ThiS degree of dJ.mage to such bUildings c\lends to a radiUS of � mile from centre: 
of dam.lge. Comp.lrc "lIh the bch.l\lour of the rem forced concrete framed 
bUilding tn the bJcLground. 
Photo No. 16. A G " S  A k. I .  The Roman Catholic Cathedral 600 yds. 
from centre of damage. The: "ails "ere of heavy IO.1d-bc3.rtng brtd. eonslruc� 
tlon. Most of the damage IS attrtbutable to blast. although lire subsequently 
com.umcd all eombu�t Jble debns. Note.n the foreground the huts c�led by the 
Japanese for temporary Iivltlg quarters nner the atomic bomb raid. 
Photo No. 17. H I R 0 S H I M  A . Typical, pari below ground, earlh· 
covered. timber framed shelter 300 yds. from the centre of damage. which is to the 
right. I n  common With similar but fully sunk shelters. none appeared to have 
been structurally damaged by the blast. E.'(posed woodwork was liable to 
.. il.l'ihburn." Internal biasl probably threw the occupants about, and gamma 
rays may have caused casualties. 
Photo N? IS .  N A G  A S A K I .  Typical sma.11 earlh·covered back yard 
shelter With crude wooden frame. les'i than 100 yds. from the centre of llamage. 
which is to the right. There was a large number of such shelters. but whereas 
nearly all those as close as thiS onc had thclr roof'\ forced tn, only half were 
damaged al 300 yd�., and practically none at half a mile from the centre of 
damage. 
l·hoto N\l. 19. N A G  A S A K 1 . TYPical Japanese houses in a street 
screened from damage by Ihe surroundmg hili . DLuldmgJ of Similar construcllon 
formed the m.:un proportion of bwldmgs m agasa�1 and Hiroshima 
Photo No. 20. N A G  A S A K I .  A room In the concrclc hospital, i nllie 
from Ihe cenlre of damage. The building \'0 as structurally unllamaged, and one 
of the few of Its type 10 escape internal fire damage. The coll.lpse of suspended 
ceilings, p:mitio.s, CIC., caused many casualties; Ilre would ha\'c tncre?.sed their 
plight. 
Photo No. 2 1 .  H I R 0 S H I M  A . Roughening or polished granite by 
.. flash " heat effect at 200 yds rrom Ihe centre or damage. The polish remains 
only where shielded by (0) a man seated on the Sleps. (b) a man leamng against 
the corner or the plmth adjoining Ihe steps and (c) in the " shadows ,. or the 
plinth mouldings. 
Photo No. 22. N A G  A S A K I .  Timber rraming scorched by heat radiation 
at f mile rrom the centre or damage. The surface is unscorchcd where it is 
shielded by the uprights. 
• 
.. ' • 
Photo 0. 23. I I  I It 0 S I I  I M A .  Sh.l\.\) .... �l by \'al"c·v. hoel on side of 
8,c,h",tdcr I i  mile ... from the centre or d"mage. The bituminOus CO.lIlng on the 
slccl pl.lIe') WJ\ affected by heat rdl,hallon C\cepi .... here shielded by the "h�1 
and ::,plOd1c. 
Photo. No. 24. N A G  A S A K " S(''ClLon of nd�c tde and part of pant tie 
rccovered from the centre of d.!m.l3;!, ,lto\\lng the " bubbltru: " cifl .. "Ct proJuced 
by the Inlcn� he.1I r.11.1I.l.llon. ole the gr.,d.ulo:l'i on the half round IIle; also 
the UIl\CorchcJ �tI Il of Ihc p.u\l l le .... here the tde ha.!> been Jlrolttled b) the 
o\erlap of Ihc ;trlJ.\cent Ilk 
moment, they measure tbe rate at which that dose is being received 
per hour. Portable meters are battery-<>perated and are hkely to be 
supplied for CIvil Defence use in a stout, felt-lined case with a 
shoulder sling. A dial reading can be taken at any time by turning 
a switch. (Sec Fig. 5.) 
These meters are for measuring dose rate contours around the 
heavily contaminated central zone at ground zero, so that safe 
working limes can be calculated from previously prepared tables. 
The process is analogous to the use of the pocket vapour and ground 
detectors for blister gas. 
ContaminaJ;oll A1eter .- This is a very sensitive instrument for the 
purpose of detecting any trace of radioactive contamination on the 
sk.in or clothing of individuals. 
Contamination meters are for installation in hospitals. cleansing 
stations. and other places where personal cleansing is necessary. By 
walking past the instrument it is possible to tell whether an individual 
is contaminated or not, as the increasing meter reading and risio& 
stridency of the incorporated loud-speaker will give immediate 
evidence of the fact. The contaminated can thus be segregated (rom 
the uncontaminated. and the former recalled aod subjected to a 
detailed .. frisking " by going over them with the probe of the instru­
ment held close 10 but not touching their skin and clothing. This 
will indicate with accuracy the exact location and area of the 
contamination. (See Fig. 6.) 
FlO. 6. Contamination Meter. 
(ji) Clothing and Equipmelll '- Though no form of c10lhing exists 
which will protect the wearer against gamma flash, or the gamma 
rays emanating from fission products and from materials in which 
radioactivity has been induced. it is quite easy to protect the in­
dividual from the alpha and beta particles which are likely to be 
given oft', since they have both a very shon range and practically 110 
powers of penetration. as explained in tbe following paragraphli. 
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Alpba partIcle. bave an extreme range of onJy a couple of mebe. 
LD air. and have no powers of penetration. The danger lies in the 
possibllllY or their being emllled by matenal whIch bas been inhaled. 
or sw&llowed. r absorbed lflto the body through broken skm (e.g .. 
wounds). Tbe hkehbood 01 exposure 01 thIS sort is regarded as 
small. 
Beta particles have 8 cange or several yards in air, and poor powers 
or penetration. Like the alpha particles tbey are extremely danger­
ous if they arc emitted by material which bas gained access to the 
interior of the body and. In addition. tbey can cause severe skin 
lDjuries if contact of such material with tbe bare skin is prolonged. 
Any ordinary c1othmg: of reasonably close weave suffices to keep 
beta active material (rom contact with the skin. provided that open· 
ings al  wrist and ankle can be kept closed in onc way or another. 
The wearing or the resprr310r Will protect against inhalation or 
i\\sllowmg. 
It  will. also. be necessary to keep contaminated dust. and the like. 
out 01 the haIr. ThIS can be done by any suitable type of hood or 
cap. nor need the latter be Don-porous. 
From the foregOing emerges a picture of suitable clothing and 
equipment for those who have to pass througb or work in a heaVily 
cootalDlDated area, namely :-
(0) Respirator. 
(b) Denim Overall, (example). 
(c) Gloves (prererably or rubber or labric). 
(d) Gumboots or strong leather boots as used in tbe Rescue 
Section. 
(iii) A voidance 0/ lIeariJ)! Contal1linat�d Areru : It should be 
a rule that no pcI:,(1n is allowed to enter or remain in a heavily 
contaminated area unless his duty compels him to do so. Members 
of the pu lie normally need to be evacuated in a planned and orderly 
manner. ReconnaLSSance personnel With their meters will know the 
e,tent or the area. and their advice must be foUowcd. 
Certain precautions must be enforced in the case of persons who 
have to stay and work in we area. No food. drink. sweets, smok­
mg materia Ill. etc., must be carried. owing to the danger of their 
contamination by fillsion products. H the work in the area is 
gOing to takc longer than 3n hour or two it will be necessary to 
provide food and drink. This could be done by mobile canteens 
bringing the necessary �upphcs from outside to the upwind perimeter 
of the area. 10 alnlght containers. and allowing no persons to partake 
until thcir hands ha\c been thoroughly washed and scrubbed (par. 
tlcular attention belDg paid to the parts under the nails). or, 
once gloves have been removed. must the hands be allowed to touch 
clothing or equipment. 
(iv) Persollal Cleallsiflg : There are numbers of protective measures 
common to both atomic and chemical warfare. The arrangements 
for cleansing contaminated personnel are an example, and an almost 
identical procedure will serve those contaminated by fission products 
IS well as those contamLDated by chemical warfare agents. 
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It has been otaled earlier in this chapter that there is no need to 
make use of non-porous protective clothing. unless chemical wadare 
agents are also present in the radioaclive area. None the less care 
will be needed in undressing so as to prevent the spread and inhala­
tion of radio-conlaminsted dust. During the process of undressing 
care must be taken not to shake particles of clothing as they are 
removed. since this would tend to make dust particles Oy. and so 
spread the contamination. A light spraying with water is definitely 
valuable and should be tbe rule. Each article when removed must 
be placed in an ordinary bin to await disposal or decontamination. 
Washing procedure will have to be very thorough. use being made 
of scrubbing brusbes ; and it will be of advantage if hand-basins and 
nail brushes cao also be provided. since the angle of skin and oail 
needs careful atleotion. After washing. the person should again be 
metered. If contamination still remains the washing will bave to 
be repeated until the meter records a negative result. 
(v) Decontamination : )t is important to realise that radioactivity. 
unJike cbemical warfare agents, cannot be destroyed. It C3D be 
removed and taken to a place where it can do DO harm, or it can 
be left to decay by natural means, which in some cases is a very 
long process and in others relatively short. There is at present DO 
other method of decontamination suitable for usc in Civil Defence. 
(a) Clothing : If clothing is badly contaminated it  will probably 
be better to dispose of it altogetber. More ligbtly con"'mina�d 
clothing can be rendered safe by more or less normal laundry 
methods. or by dry cleaning. 
(b) Other Materials : If decontamination can be laken in hand 
before the contamination has had time to be absorbed into the 
material, removal by methods similar to those used (or removal of 
persistent gas contamination can be undertaken. 
(c) Streets and Public Places : There is at present DO known method 
of achieving complete decontamination, thougb basing down will 
certainly help to aid dispersion provided it can be done witbout 
creating a further hazard with the water thus used : i.e .• the disposal 
of such water must be carefully watched. If condition. permit Ibe 
Irea can be left to the process of natural radioactive decay. 
(d) Food : Gamma rays bave no harmful effects upon foodstun •. 
Foods which were within very close range of neutrons when the 
bomb exploded are likely to be irradiated and would have to be 
disposed of irrespective of whether tbey were in airtight containers 
or not. The depositing of fission products upon unprotected food· 
stuffs constitutes the greatest danger. which would be obviatod by 
storing of food in airtight containers. 
(vi) Periodical Medical Examination and Rules GO\'erning 
Exposure : It will be necessary to keep a careful check upon the 
health o[ Civil Defence personnel whose work carries them into 
radioactive areas. Meters of one kind or another will indicate th� 
amount of dose received on any one occasion and will warn the 
individual when it is no longer safe to expose him or hersel!. 
Linked with this problem is that o[ the dose which may not be 
exceeded. This maximum permissible dose is now under active 
investigation and will be notified in due course. It depends to 
some extent on the time over which it is accumulated. It can 
3 1  
be saId now, however, that there will have to be a number of 
durerent seal .. laId down to meet the varying COn<lltlOns of opera­
Uons. For e.umple, !.here will be a scale requlfcd for the general 
public. another scale [or Civil De[ence Corps personnel and the 
personnel of associated Services suoh as the Pollce and tho Fire. 
aDd a further scale {or special emergency work such as the rc"-Cue 
o[ trapped sbelter occupants. These scales. "hen finally deciJed. 
must be known to all holdUlg posillons of responsibIlity so that they 
can t.ake operational decisions. and also to those concerned with 
medical and firM aid work. The general object wIll be to ensure. 
as far as practical, that exposure is under careful control, and if 
exceptIonal risks have to be taken at least they will not be ordered 
blindfold 
A radioactive dose is measured JO units known as roentgens. 
Ractiation meters for Civil Defence. such as the indj\;dual dose 
meier. measure either roentgens or roentgens per hour dependin,t 
on whether they measure the tOlal radiation do�e or the radialion 
dose ratc. The exception is the Contammalion Meter, which gives 
an indication of small traces of radioactivity. and is concerned 
with measuring the amount of radioactivity contamination_ This is 
measured in curies (or mill i-curies or micro-curies as the case may 
be). 
21 Radiation Sl Ddrome 
{i) Acute : Radiation sickness is seen in its most characteristic 
r on in individuals who have been exposed to external body radia­
tion at the moment of explosion. Acute symptoms are unlikely to 
arise from exposure to fission products unless the area is highly 
cOlltaminated and c.xposure is early and sufficiently lengthy. 
The most severe cases develop symptoms and signs of deep shock. 
WIth extreme weakness and vomiting. within a few hours ot ex­
posure. With a lesser dose the onset of symptoms rna} not be 
apparent for some days : varying degrees of shock are then noted. 
with vomiting. rising fever and marked weakness. Those who 
survive for some time may later show signs of damage to the blood 
system. gastric and intestinal disturbances supervene, and infection 
IS common. 
The least severe cases may not develop symptoms until after the 
third week, and in these recovery is the nile; similarly. patients \\ ho 
survive to the sixth week have a good chance of recO\ery. One of 
the most characteristic signs of radiation sickness seen in these 
CAses. as \\ ell as In victims wbo !lurvi\e for ten days or longer, is 
foIling out of UIC hair. usually confined to the scalp bUI sometimes 
affectmg the c) cbrows or beard : re-gro\\ th of bair occurs in three 
or four months. 
Some of the more serious complications of radiation sickness are 
due to damage to thc bone marrow, from which most of tbe norma1 
onSliluents of the blood originate. This damage affects the pro­
duction of both whitc and red blood cells. with a resulting diminution 
of their numbers III the circulation. As the white blood cells pia) 
a \lIal part III the defence of tbe body agalOst bacteria. their ah...ence 
or dmunution In the circulation enables these bacteria to gain the 
upper hand. and infection may be WIdespread. Similarly. the dlDunu­
tion In the number of red blood cells gives rise. very often, to se\ere 
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anaemia or bloodlessnesS-a condition which is aggravated by tbe 
tendency to bleeding which is a common feature of the disease. 
The cause of death is usuaUy a combination of infection. loss of 
blood and anaemia. 
(ii) Chro,lic : As at present defined, for peace time occupations. 
the maximum pemlissible dose rate for repealed exposures, is 0.1 
roentgen per S-bour day, or 0.5 roentgen per week.· (For a definition 
of roentgen wbkb is the unit of measurement for a radioactive dose, 
see Appendix ll.) 
Repeated exposures. over 100g continuous periods. to daily dose 
rates considerably in excess of those quoted above may result in 
symptoms of chronic radiation sickness as shown by gastro-intestinal 
discomfort. increasing weakness, and blood changes of varying degrees 
of severity. Repeated exposures to doses of 25 roentgens and above 
may give rise to sickness. 
Under peace time conditions, as described in the preceding sub­
paragraph. there is no risk of sterility occurring. Under war time 
conditions. where increased risks may have to be taken in the course 
of urgent operations, a risk of temporary sterility may arise. It 
should be noted.. however, that tbe close investigations which have 
been, and are, in fact, still being conducted in the two Japanese 
cities of lliroshima aod Nagasaki, show clearly that t.bis is a purely 
temporary phase . 
Chronic skin conditions may also arise if radioactive material is 
left in contact witb the skin or is otherwise carried. on the person for 
prolonged periods. 
First aid Treatme1lt : Trealment for shock is most important. as 
well as for any other injuries sustained. Complete pbysical and 
mental rest are of tbe greatest importance togetber with careful COD­
trol of environmental temperatures to prevent chilling. and 
scrupulous care to prevent infection through any wounds. Many 
casualties will be suffering from radiation sickness and external 
wounds ; and a reduced blood formation Jays the body open to wound 
infection. The skin of radiation victims is very susceptible to heat 
and great care will be necessary in the ruse of bot water bottles and 
other sources of beal. If radioactive contamination is suspected, 
cleansing will be necessary before admission to a First Aid Post or 
Hospital. 
Cbronic conditions are soon recognised if the cause is known or 
suspected. These cases sbould be referred to appropriate medical 
centres ; treatment of the condition and avoidance of further exposure 
are usually followed by a steady recovery. but periodical medical 
examinations may be necessary in certain cases. Reference is made 
only to first aid treatment in this pamphlet There is much thal 
can be done on the medical side to cure and mitigate the effects 
which are described. These measures will be made known in the 
most appropriate way to all those who require Jhis medical and 
technical knowledie . 
• Note :-A dose rate orO.5 roentgen per week represenls the dose which can be 
tolerated, without ill effect, for a period of at least 60 yoora assuming an expo.ure 
of tbe whole body. 
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22 Radioactivity Poi5oDiDg 
This term IS used to describe the re,uits that may Collow the '"trO' 
ductlan of radioactive materials into the body. where they will act as 
local or systemic poisons due to the emission of damagtng radiations. 
TheltC radioactive materiab may gain entrance mto the body in 
vnflous ways ; e.g. :-
Ca) By mhalatlon in tbe absence of a resplf31or. 
(b) By ingestion. or entrance by the moutb through contaminated 
Cood. water, pipes, cigarettes, etc 
(c) By injeclion, or entrance 1010 the circulation through con· 
laminated wounds, abrasion� or otherwise damaged skID. 
The symptom" that may follow the entrance of radioactive material 
Into the body may be of rapid on..,ct If  the do� ilt very large . morc 
ohen It is �Iow and subtle In development. pos",ihly extending over a 
period of month., or evcn year�. The effl.:cb may be localised to onc 
part of the body (c.g .. lungs. slin. etc.) or they nu}" become systemic 
anJ give ri...e to gencral constitutional dl!t\urbanccs. 
As thcse radloacti\C materials are effective 10 extremely minute 
quantities. prevention is obviously the only line to adopt. This u 
effectcd by a wcll·tilllng respirator. hood. and adequate protective 
clothing ; and by the avoidance of all food, drink or smoking while 
In a contaminated condition. and the observance of a SLrict working 
and c1ean3ing discipline. 
First aid IS only applicable to personnel who may sustain cuts or 
wounds while working under contaminated conditions . when this 
OCCU13, the damaged skin should be flushed freely with runnm& water 




27. Elfects on PenoD5 
CHAPTER IV 
BLAST 
The direct effecLS of blast [rom high air burst bombs on persons 
is less than might be expected and serious internal injury is rare. The 
bulk of the casualties wiU be secondary due to injuries (rom falJing 
masonry and flying debris. Such injuries would occur up to 1*·2 
miles and to a lesser extent from glass and other flying debris at 
greater distances. The greatest number of indirect injuries and of 
deaths is likely to be caused by collapse of buildings due to blast with 
the survivors possibly trapped aod exposed to fire daogers. It has 
been estimated that 70 per cent. of aU casualties would suffer from 
physical injury of some sort. 
Protection against blast would not present an insoluble problem. 
Japanese air raid shelters, even of poor construction, stood up weU 
and underground shelters were a complete protection. Shelters 
could be constructed to resist both blast and gamma rays. 
28. Effects on Material 
From air burst bombs the blast wave is [rom above downwards 
and strikes roofs first, and near the centre of the damaged area 
buildings are collapsed or, with specially strong buildings, roofs are 
crushed in or dished even where the walls remain standing. 
Further away, where the blast wave is becoming more horizontal, 
buildings are pushed over or distorted. 
The type of building and the distance from ground zero are the 
factors influencing reaction to blast. Unframed buildings like ordinary 
dwelling houses suffer more severe damage than framed buildings. 
whether of reinforced concrete or steel. and buildings of earthquake­
resisting construction remain practically undamaged at 2.000 feet 
from ground zero. Bridges. which are built to withstand vertical 
pressure. stand up to the blast much better than ordinary houses. 
which are not so constructed. though reflection [rom roads. rivers, 
elc., may cause displacement on the underside and is a point to be 
carefully watched. 
The British Mission estimated that from a high air burst bomb 
such as was used in Japan. an ordinary British city with 1 5  houses 
and 45 persons to the acre would suffer damage to dwelling hOllies 
to a distance of 2 to 2; miles from ground zero on the fonowing 
scaJe:-
Na/ure o[ Damage 
Demolished or requiring demolition 
Uninhabitable and requiring major repairs 
Temporarily uninhabitable but requlflng 
only minor repairs 
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A verage Radius from 
Ground Zero and Number 
o[ J/ol/ses lllvoired 
I mile 
30,000 houses 
I-It  miles 
35,000 houses 
I t  miles-2 to 2t miles 
50,000-100,000 bouses 
E 
J hI> damage would a(fcct the dwellings of 4OU,OOO people and, 
even allowlIlg for those who might be ca�ualtli:s and those v.-bo could 
return after minor repair:, to their hou.M:s had been completed, or 
who did not have to leave their bouses at all, some 100,000 persons 
would need rehou,tng, creatmg a vcl)' hlg Civj) lkfence problem. 
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29. EIf..,ts on Public lJtilil) �eniCC5 
The effccts of the high Bir bur!-ot bomb on public utility .. ervices 
would be conlined to damage abm·'c ground. Gas and watcr mains 
would be undamaged except possibly where they are carried over 
bndges. Sewer!), 100. !i:hould be all right. Over-ground installations 
!-ouch as gas bolders, water pumping SWlIons. elecLricity sub-M.allons, 
overhead electricity. tramway, telephone and telegraph cables, trams, 
bU5CS and motor cars would be damaged more or less severely up 
to one mile or so from ground zero and would present 3 �ig problem 
of repair to the ultlity services, Railway and tramway tracks would 
prohably remain intact but be affected by debn�, adjaccnt fires. 
overturned rolling stock. etc. Ground burst or low air burst bombs 
would produce a cmtering effect and earth :;hQcl involving consider­
able area� of underground damage. but the ground area affected 
would be mudl smaller. Delayed danger from induced radioactivity 
and fission produc� might. Lf prescnt. also considerably complicate 
the work o[ repair. 
30. Rescue Problerru 
Apart from fire onc of the major problems would be rescue work. 
and it mu�t be accepted that the effect of blast. as indeed was dis­
covered during the last war. will inevitably produce large quantities 
of rubble and debris which \\ ill complicate the rescue problem 
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Rescue work, as always. requires high discipline and technique, and 
it  is clearly unponant tbat in any area the design and location 
of sbelters should be carefully mapped beforehand and made avail­
able for rescue parties. The rescue parties should also familiarise 
themselves with the use of these maps, since after an explosion the 
ordinary landmarks may nOl be available and approach to any 
such shelters would almost certainly be difficult owing to the rubble 
and debris. 
It will be of first importance to initiate some action with tho 
greatest possible speed, even though full operations will take time 
to develop. Rescue parties with light equipment might be able, 
[or example. to go straight in over the rubble and begin a preliminary 
reconnaissance and start rescue operations while the main force 
follows up. This force may require mechanical equipment to clear a 
path for their heavy vehicles. and the sooner people trapped in shelters 
have some evidence that help is  arriving the better. 10 certain cases 
where conditions arc suitable, it may be possible to make the quickest 
approach by water. and in studying this problem all these possibili­
ties must be taken into account and lfaining will be initiated in due 
course so as to prepare rescue parties and others to operate under 
conditions \\ hich may be quite unfamiliar at present. 
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ELEMENTARY ATOMIC PHYSICS 
1. The Structure 01 Matter in RelatioD to the Size o[ the Atom 
I n  order to understand the way in which matter is built-up it must 
be reaJised that substances which we think of as solids in fact are 
not ; in other words matter is not continuous. From our point of 
view a very thin piece of steel, such as a safety razor blade. is solid ; 
from the point of view of the atom it is more aki.n to a piece of 
rabbit wire . 
Wire stops ball as if it were saUd . 
.. . , . . 
J, :', '..;" . .' . ,'. . .. . ' . �
. ,  .. .  , . . 
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Wire allows sand to pass through. 
Flo. 8. 
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Now let us lhlOk about a piece 01 l ·jnch mesh rabbit Wire, first 
from the point of view of a cricket ball, and secondly from the point 
of view of a handful of dry sand If a cricket baJJ falls on to tbe 
sheet of Yo ire It will be stopped, and the cricket ball could scarcely 
he blamed If it said that tbe sheet of wire was a solid sheet. On tbe 
other hand if a handful of sand was dropped the grain; of >and would 
fall through the sheet of wire ; true there ","culd be collisions be· 
tween the grams of sand and the wire, but none the less the sand 
would go through the " Ire. and the sand would not con�ider the \\Ire 
�hcct 3b being solid or CODtIDUOUS matter. (See Fig. 8.) 
2. Siructure 01 the Atom 
The atom is composed of a " nucleus ' and circling round 1t tbere 
are a number of small ,"ery light particles known as electrons each 
of \\ hi b carries a negauve electric cbarge. This set·up may be 
likened 10 our solar system with the sun 3S tbe counterpart of the 
nucleus and the earth, and other planets which revolve round i t  
taking the place 01 tbe electrons. (See Fig. 9.) 
PIO. 9. 
Nucleu, 
"'-___ ElectrOns mOving .( In puhs known 
U orblu 
11te nucleus is not just a solid lump but is composed of two kinds 
01 particles held vcry strongly buncbed together (See Fig. 10.) One 
kind of particle carries a posil1ve electric cbarge and is called a 
proton. and tbe other carries DO electric cbarge and is called a 
neutron. Protons and neulrons 3re practically the same weight and 
both arc very much he:1vicr than the electron. The number of 
proton� and electrons IS sucb tbat as a whole tbe 3tom is electrically 
neutral. 





\\ �en atoms combine to form substances the nucleus of eacb atom 
r�mal.
ns unchanged but tbe orbits link·up. This is not unlike the 
situation c�used wb�n p.eople link arms,. h�ving done so they have become a group havl�g Its own characteristics, yet the characteristics 
of each person remam unchanged. (See Figs. I I  and 1 2.) 
• 
Hydrogen Atom Oxygen Atom 




Hydrogen Atom Oxygen Atom Hydrogen Atom 
Linked.up (combined chemically) to form water. 
Fto. 12. 
Cbemical reactions IN NO WAY AFFECT tbe nuclei of the 
atoms ; they are brought about by the linking·up-or the unlinking 
-of electron orbits. 
3. Radioactivity 
It bas long been known that some of the heavier elements emit 
radiations ; such elements are said La be radioactive. The radiations 
come from the nuclei of the atoms and may be fast moving charged 
particles (alpha particles and electrons) and penetrating radiation 
similar to X·rays (gamma rays). 
The radioactivity continues through many intermediate stages until 
finally aU the atomic nuclei have cbanged into atoms wbich are quite 
stable. Thus radium-which is radioactive-ultimately becomes lead 
which is stable. 
The time taken for this to happen depends on tbe element in 
question ; for example-after 1 .600 years half of a piece of radium 
will have become lead, after another 1.600 years only a quarter of 
the original amount will remain as radium and so on. This time 
is known as the U half·life "-for radium it is 1.600 years. for some 
elements it is only a fraction of a second whereas for others it may 
be millions of years. Under certain circumstances an\' clement 
can become radioactive. 
4. Neutrons 
Because matter is not continuous and because tbe neutron is not 
electrically charged it can travel a long way in matter and, indeed, 
may pass rigbt througb It 
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5.  FissI .. 
Some neulrons when passing through mattcr will coUide with a 
nucleus and when this takes places one of two things may bappen : 
It may either bounce off and continue its journey, Or It may be 
captured by the nucleus, that is. it may enter, and become part of. 
the nucleus. 
The added mass and energy of the captured neutron causes tbe 
nucleu� to become unstable (radioactive) and to restore its equili­
brium may do One of two things : it may either emil radjations with 
or without neutrons. or with heavy elements, It may break in two and 
emit one or more neutrons ; tbls process is known as fission. (See 
Figs, 1 3, 1 4  and 1 5,) 
, 
FlO. 13. Neutron about to enter nucleu$ 
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When fission takes place the energy released is enormous-if a 
pound of fissionable material could all be fissioned it would release 
as much energy as the explosion of 8.000 tons of T.N.T. 
Some substaDces� after capturing a D.eutron, fission more easily 
than others : Urawurn 235 and Plutonium markedly so. Fission 
is only observed in the heaviest elements. 
FlO. 14. Nucleus after neutron capture. Excess energy 
causes distortion ; emission of radiations may restore 
equilibrium or the nucleus may fission. 
Plo. I S. After fission: the two &sIon fragments move apart, In thb Instance 
there are 3 fission neutrOns. 
6. Explosive R ... uiremeall 
If this enormous energy release is to be used as an explosive the 
following requirements must be satisfied : -
(a) The fission process must be capable of being initiated with­
out the use of bulky and heavy apparatus. 
(b) The fissioning of one nucleus must be capable of producing 
sufficient neutrons to propagate the process throughout the 
mass of fissionable material-that is to say It must start 
a chain reaction. 
(e) The chain reaction must progress throughout the whole 
mass at such a speed that not only does it give rise to 
a rapid release of energy-a sine qua non of an explosion 
-but so rapidly that the mass of fissionable material is 
neither melted nor blown asunder before the bulk of it bas 
bad time to fission. 
Be'ow a certain size (the CRITICAL SIZE) a chain reaction cannot 
take place ; above tbis size nothing can prevent it taking place. 
The existence of a critical size is due to the decreasing ratio of 
surface-volume as the size increases ; by decreasing the mass of 
fissionable material the ratio surface-volume is increased aod there 
is a greater possibility of neutron escape at the surface. 
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By using a sufficient mass of Uranium 235 or Plutonium. enough 
of the neutrons produced in fis'iion will be utilised in producing 
further fissions to propagate the process throughout the mass of 
material ; moreover, the process will proceed in such a small ume 
that tbe result is an explosion, This time IS of the order of a few 
micro·seconds and a micro-second is one-millionth of a second 
(Sec Fig. 16.) 







rI. nOI'l-uptu re 
'r-' colll$lon 
Tbe figure giv a representation or the paths of neuuons in the 
Initial stages of n cbam reaction. 
The chain started witb fission I brougbt about by a neu tron wbich 
started at 0 in the eentre of the material This fission gave two 
neutrons one of wh i h was IO!lt. the other causing fission 2. This 
fission gave ri"C 10 tbree neutrons one of wbich was lost. the other 
two causing fissions numbered 3. and so on. It can be seen that 
non-capture collisions are frequent as shown at �. By the use or 
a reflector the build-up of the reaction \\ould have been enhanced 
as some of the neutrons shown as lost might well have been reflected 
back in 10 the mass 
7 The AtorrUc Bomb 
From the above It follows that in principle the bomb may be 
made up as follows : The material used may be pure or reasonably 
pure Uranium 235 or Plutonium. It may be made up into two 
or more plcces eBch of which is sub�ritical in size yet. when brought 
together are well above lhe critical mass-for lhe more material 
that IS assembled together the I s the proportional leakage of 
neuU'ons out of the mBSS and, therefore. the greater the increase of 






With two sub-critical masses suitably apart DO self-sustainiog chain 
reaction can start ; when they are brought together nothing can 
prevent it starting. 1£ they are brought together slowly the reaction 
will start as they approach each mher and long before the whole 
mass bas fissioned the material will have melted � instead of an 
explosion comparable to that of thousands of tons of T.N.T. there 
will merely be an energy release sufficient to melt the assembly. 
The whole should be encased in some dense material which will 
delay the expansion of the mass sufficiently to permit additional 
generations of fission before the process is brought to a stop by 
increasing size:. (See Fig. 17.) 





ALPHA PARTICLE.-A helium nucleus (positively cbarged) travelling 
at high speed. Given out when atoms of UraOlum, Radium and 
some other substances undergo spontaneous radioactive break­
down. Very short range and negligible penetrating power. 
e.g., stopped by a sheet of paper. Dangerous if emitted within 
tbe body. i.e .. if Uranium or Radium. etc .• is inhaled, swal­
lowed or obtains entrance to the body througb wounds. 
ATOM. maUest unit of an element that retains the characteristics of 
that element. 
BETA PARTICLES.-Fast electrons emined when certain atoms undergo 
radioactive breakdown. Beta emitting substances caD cause 
severe skin burns and are dangerous if they gain entrance to 
the body as with alpha emitters. 
CHAIN REACTION.-Self-sustaining process in which some neutrons 
from ODC splitting atom are able to splat more atoms. selling 
free still more neutrons which carry on the reaction indefinitely. 
COSMIC RAvs.-Penetrating radiation coming to the earth from outer 
space. 
CRITICAL 512E.-The size of a piece of Uranium 235 or PlutonIUm 
which is just large enough to suppOrt a cham reaction within 
itself. 
CURI"B.-A unit of radioactivity approximately that associated with 
1 gram of Radium. 
DOSE.-Thc amount o[ radiation energy absorbed by a person. 
Measured in roentgens. 
DoSE RATE.-The rate at which radiation is received. Measured in 
rocn tgens per bour. 
ELECTRoN.-The lightest known particle. A constituent of aU atoms. 
around whose nuclei they revolve in orbits not unlike those 
of planets round the SUD. 
ELEMENT.-One of the basic substances which cannot be further 
decomposed into any other more basic substance by chemical 
means. Ninety·two elements are found naturally on the earth. 
FALL.OuT.-Tbe faU-out o[ fission products from tbe airborne cloud 
of radioactive material from a bomb resulting in the deposi· 
tion of fission products on tbe ground. 
FlssION.-The splitting of an atomic nucleus into two more or less 
equal fragments and a number of neutrons, with the liberation 
of a large amount of energy. 
FISSION PRODuCTs.-Fragments produced when atoms undergo 
fission. 
FIRE S'!'ORM.-A. condition which may develop in 3 large area fire. If the uphft of the hOl gases over tbe area is concentrated and 
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powerful enougb to produce a violent wind at the peripbery ; 
this re.sujels the spread of tire outwards but intensifies the 
extent of combustion m the burrung area. 
FRISKING.-Thc passing of tbe probe of a Contammation Meter over 
the skin and clothing of a person. Tbis will indicate tbe 
presencc or absence of radioactive contamination. 
GAMMA FLASlI. -A phrase coined to distinguish tbe intense emission 
of gamma rays [row an atom.ic expJosion from the gamma 
rays gIven off by natural and induced radioactive substances 
and by fission products. 
GAMMA RA ys.-Extremely penetrating radiation of very short wave­
length. Can destroy living tissues and produce a number of 
physical effects. e.g .• fluorescence, and chemical effects. X·rays 
are exactly tbe same radiation as low energy gamma rays, bur 
are produced from special elccLrical machines. 
GROUND ZCRO.-Tbat point at ground level vertically beneath the 
point of expJosion of an atomic bomb. The greatest damage 
o( aU kinds ts to be found bere. 
HALf. LIPE.-The lime taken [or half the Duclei in a radioactive 
substance 10 disintegrate spontaneously-always constant for 
nuclei of the same sort. Varies [rom a few millionths of a 
second in the case of some materials to 10.000 million years 
[or various types of nuclei. 
HEAT FLASH.-The intense beat radiation emJtted. by an atomic 
bomb al the moment of explosion. Causes burns and primary 
fires over a wide area, 
Hot AREA.-The area in which residual radioaclivity may be 
detected after tbe explosion of an atomic bomb. 
INDUCED RADIOACTlvITY.-Radioactivlty induced in many materials 
by neutron bombardment as [rom the explosion of the atomlc 
bomb. 
NEUTRoN,-One of the particles composing the nucleus of an atom. 
ApproximateJy the same mass as a proton, but is electrically 
neutral. Has the property of penetration of all materials, 
and the rendering of many of them radioactive. Damages the 
human tissues. 
NucL lms.-The " core " of an atom, where nearly all the mass is 
concentrated. Composed of prOlons and neutrons. 
PERMISSIBLE DOSE.-Tbe maximum total dose of radiation over auy 
given period which is believed ro cause no permanent ill effect 
to the body. 
PLUTONIUM.-A metal of high atomic weight made by bombarding 
atoms of Uranium with neutrons. Can undergo fission and 
has replaced Uranium 235 in tbe later atomic bombs. Is a 
man·ruade element and was not found in nature until after 
it bad been made artificially. 
PROTON.-A positively charged particle found in the nuclei of all 
atotm. 
RADlATION,-Energy in the form of eleclro·maglletic waves. May 




RADIATION M£TERs.-lru.truments of vanous kinds whose purpose is 
to de!cct radioactivity, and to measure radiation dose and 
radlation dose rate. Some record the total dose received up 
to any given moment � others record tbe rate at which that 
dose is being received per hour. 
RADIATION SYNDROME.-A medical condition which follows any 
considerable amount of tissue damage cau ed by X or gamma 
rays, etc. Symptoms not usually perceptible until the passage 
of a few bours, or even of some days. 
RAoIOACfIV[ POISONING.-The results which may follow the 
introduction of radioactive materials into the body. 
RADIOACTIVITY.-The production of alpha or beta particles and 
gamma rays by the spontaneous breakdown oC atomic nuclei ; 
also as a result of the explosion of an atomic bomb. 
ROI.!NTGbN. The measuring unit of radiation dose. 
SCREENING.-Radialions arc reduced in intensity on passing through 
matter. This phenomenon is known as screening. 
SHIElDING.-See Screening. 
URANIUM.-A heavy metal derived from naturally occurring ores, 
usually pitchblende. ormally the surface is a dark-yellowish 
brown colour. It has the highest atomic weight of the elements 
found in nature. Is mildly radioactive and contains 0.75 per 
cent. of Uranium 235. 
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